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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs do not concur in defendants' statement of
facts. It omits significant details and states as fact matters
which are not.
Richard Lee, agent of Western States Wholesale
Supply, a corporation doing business as Western States
Construction, without instructions or limitations on his
authority (R. 268), represented to the plaintiffs that
their home in Cedar City had been selected for a very
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special offer. He stated to the plaintiffs that he was not
a mere agent but was the company and desired to use
plaintiffs' home for a special advertising project; he
promised certain improvements, including aluminum sid.
ing, new windows, storm doors, and a roof, at a cost to
plaintiffs of $2,650, and that as a further consideration
to the plaintiffs for the advertising use to be made of
this special project, the plaintiffs were to be paid $200
for each subsequent job done by the company up to 26
such jobs (referred to as units). The contract (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1) was signed by the plaintiffs and by Lee for
the company. (R. 16-18, 23, 29, 296, 298)
The contract provided that the plaintiffs could at
their option pay off the entire amount at any time or
pay monthly payments, the first such monthly payment
not to be due until "60 days after completion of work."
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1)
Defendant Jack Lords and others working for him
took photographs of the home before and during work.
(R. 32, 206, 278, 279)
The work was not done in a workmanlike manner,
there being numerous defects. ( R. 33-48, 110)
While the work was still in progress and despite
the provisions of the contract that the plaintiffs' first
payment was not due until 60 days after completion of
the work, Lords went to Cedar City to get the plaintiffs
to sign papers for third party financing. (R. 49, 274)
There is evidence that at this time Lords repudiated that
portion of the contract dealing with the $200 credit for
each of the 26 job units. ( R. 49) Plaintiffs declined to

sign the requested financing papers. (R. 204) Shortly
thereafter and while the work was still uncompleted to
his knowledge, Lords caused a mechanics lien for the
full contract price to be recorded against the property.
(R. 204, 205, 209, 279) Laborers and materialmen also
filed liens. ( R. 284) There is evidence from which the
jury could deduce that these other liens were also filed
at the insistence of Lords. (R. 130) They are all on the
same form, apparently the same typewriter, and all filed
at the same time at the request of Lords' attorney. See,
e.g., Defendants' Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Advised that the liens subjected them to possible
attorneys fees and costs, plaintiffs on the advice of their
then attorney, Robert L. Gardner, agreed to make payments which would remove the liens to avoid these potentially large expenses. As part of this negotiation, Lords
agreed to complete the improvements and to obtain releases of the liens. Plaintiffs withheld $500 of the contract
price pending such completion of the contract work. (R.
8, 11, 77, 89,90, 178, 193, 198, 283)
Although the liens were released, neither Lords nor
anyone else ever appeared to finish the work called for
by the contract. (R. 48, 87, 90, 100, 102, 115, 189, 193,
206, 212)
Plaintiffs ultimately brought suit to enforce the contract. Defendants moved for summary judgments on the
theory of an accord and satisfaction based on a letter sent
by Robert L. Gardner to the defendants' attorney. At
the hearing on the motion it developed that the letter
was but one stage in a series of negotiations wherein the
parties agreed on some things but not on others. Specifi-
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cally the plaintiffs would pay certain moneys to the de.
fendants; the defendants would release the liens and
would complete the work under the contract, the plain.
tiffs holding $500 pending such completion. The question
of the 26 job units under the contract was discussed but
not resolved. Defendants never, however, completed per.
formance under the contract or these subsequent negotia.
tions. (See Supplemental Transcript of Summary Judg.
ment Proceedings) The motion was denied; it was renewed at trial and again denied.
At trial, defendant Lords admitted that there had
been from 25 to 30 job units completed subsequent to
the plaintiffs' contract.
At the conclusion of a two day trial, the jury rendered its unanimous verdict for the plaintiffs in the
amount of $6,900 which sum was reduced $500 by the
Court to compensate for the funds withheld earlier by
the plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THERE WAS NEITHER AN ACCORD
NOR A SATISFACTION.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, and at
trial, on the theory of an accord and satisfaction. They
premised this on the letter sent by Gardner to Knowlton.
(Def. Ex. 3) At this time the work had been only partially completed, and in an unworkmanlike manner at
that; Lords had repudiated certain parts of the contract;
Lords had filed a lien for the full contract price even
though the work was not finished ; and others had also

5
filed liens even though the work was not completed and
the plaintiffs were not in default.
At the hearing, Robert L. Gardner, attorney for the
plaintiffs at the time pertinent, testified that certain
money was held out pending completion of the work by
the defendants. (Transcript of Summary Judgment Proceedings, p. 11, 12) He testified that Lords was to complete the project. There were discussions about the $200
per unit. Plaintiff Vernal Stratton testified that the promised \Vork was never completed. (Transcript of Summary
J'Jdgment Proceedings, p. 16)
It is obvious from the record that the defendants
failed to prove an accord. There was not agreement concerning the $200 per unit for 26 units portion of the
contract. It is undenied that the plaintiffs withheld $500
from the contract price pending completion of the contract work by defendants, and it is equally undenied that
the contract was never completed. This was the state of
the e\·idence at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment and at trial.
Absent proof of a full settlement, intended as such,
it would have been error for the jury to have found an
accord, let alone a satisfaction. Owens v. Hunter, 91 Ariz.
7, 368, P. 2d 753 ( 1962).
It is elementary, hornbook law, requiring no lengthy
citation of authorities that even had there been an accord,
upon the failure of the defendants to perform thereunder,
the plaintiffs would be entitled to pursue their remedies
under the original contract. Whitney v. Richards, 17
Utah 226, 53 Pac. 1122 ( 1898) ; Restatement of Con-
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tracts, §417; Williston on Contracts, § 1841 (Rev. ed.
1938).

Since there was no accord, and not even performance by the defendants of those acts which they did
promise to do, and which they were already obligated
to do, the trial court was correct in denying their motion
for summary judgment. There is substantial competent
evidence to support the verdict of the jury which rejected
the accord and satisfaction theory also.
POINT II. THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT
AGAINST DEFENDANT JACK LORDS.
This case was tried to a jury which brought in a
unanimous verdict against defendants West States Construction and Jack Lords. This was not error. There was
ample, competent evidence to support the verdict.
The jury could hardly avoid finding that Lords
participated personally from the outset with full knowledge of all the salient facts and as the prime mover in
this unsavory affair. Richard Lee was sent out by Lords
to get contracts, without, according to Lords either instructions or limitations. Lee represented that the house
improvement transaction was to be used for selling other
improvement contracts and that pictures would be taken
for that purpose. (R. 24) Lords, himself, took some pictures.
Even though Lords knew full well that the contract
provisions did not obligate plaintiffs to pay one cent until
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60 days after completion of the work, Lords attempted
to get the plaintiffs to agree to a third-party financing,
and when he was unsuccessful, he personally undertook
to place on the property mechanics' liens for the full contract price even though the work had not been completed.
There is evidence that he was instrumental in getting
others to file liens. They were all done at the same time,
apparently on the same typewriter and placed of record
by Lords' attorney. There is evidence that at the time of
the negotiations with Robert L. Gardner that Lords personaly ratified, adopted and assumed the obligations of
the contract and undertook personally to see to their
performance. ( R. 90, 91, 114, 115, 93, 198, 283)
There is also competent evidence from which the
jurv could conclude that Lords was party to an attempt
to deprive the plaintiffs of their contract rights by use
of a forged contract, omitting the $200 per unit for 26
units provision. Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 with Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29 and Defendants' Exhibit 20. The jury
could well deduce personal participation in this portion
of the transaction. The jury could find that Lords' personal participation, adoption and ratification of the contract obligations, and personal, intentional, imposition of
the mechanics' lien even before completion of the work,
all tied him personally into what is less than a savory
transaction. On the basis of these numerous personal
involvements and the logical implications to be drawn
therefrom, the jury could well find, and were justified
in so doing that Lords was personally liable, the company
front being a mere alter ego.
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That he should eschew personal liability and prefer
the shield of the corporate veil for nefarious business
activities is understandable. The jury, however, on competent evidence, determined otherwise. Being based on
competent evidence, the verdict of the jury must stand,
in accordance with 'veil established principles of law.
Toomer\ Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239
P. 2d 163 ( 1951); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247
P. 2d 273 (1952).
POINT III. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Defendants assert that instruction number 5 is erroneous as far as defendant Jack Lords is concerned.
This is not so. Defendant Lords and his corporate codefendant answered in the first instance by simply alleging the defense of a partially completed accord and satisfaction. (Answer, pleading file p. 11) By an amended
answer first filed at the date of the trial, both defendants
re-alleged the defense of accord and satisfaction "between the parties" and estoppel. (Amended Answer,
pleading file, p. 23) In neither the original answer nor
the amended answer is there a specific, intelligible denial
of Jack Lords' implication and relationship with the
shoddy transaction sufficient to raise the position defend·
ant Lords now takes on appeal.
Since, in addition, there was competent evidence
upon which the jury could impose liability on Lords, even
if there be error in this instruction, it was nonprejudicial.
A.s a matter of note, but not noted by defendants,
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the trial court in its instruction number 5 repeated almost
verbatim the only portion of the defendants' amended
answer which could be any stretch of the imagination be
construed as a denial of Lords' involvement and liability.
This is the last sentence of instruction number 5 which
is almost identical with the last sentence in the defendants' amended answer prior to the prayer therein.
Considering this careful patterning of the court's
instruction to the defendants' amended answer it is difficult to envision the basis for defendants' complaint about
their own theory and authorship.
Defendants object to instruction number 14 which
sets forth the law of private contractors bonds, alleging
such instruction to be irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial. They do not state how or why it might be prejudicial.
Plaintiffs contend that in view of the defendants'
wrongful and intentional placing of a mechanic's lien on
the property and their implication in getting others to do
likewise, the law relative to such liens and contractors
bonds is highly pertinent. Defendants had not even completed their work when they caused the lien to be recorded. Surely the jury was entitled to know the effect
of this bad faith action. Defendants merely assert that
there was error in the instruction; they do not point out
how it could have been error. It was not.
Defendants further object to instruction number 17
which provided for the imposition of a single sum as
damages, asserting that it permitted the jury to assess
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punitive damages against defendant Lords. Since the jury
verdict was less than the amount of possible actual dam.
ages, defendants were not prejudiced. However, even had
the jury awarded punitive damages against defendant
Lords there would have been no error considering that
Lords was, undeniably in some instances, the prime mover
in this deal and in other instances probably the prime
mover - with full and calculating knowledge.
Plaintiffs contend there was no error in the jury in·
structions, and even were there error, in absence of proof
of harm the verdict must be affirmed. Mace v. Tingey,
106 Utah 420, 149 P. 2d 832 ( 1944); Hales v. Peterson,
11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, the plaintiffs respect·
fully pray this Court to dismiss the appeal and to affirm
the judgment rendered on the jury verdict below.
Respectfully submitted,

J.
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Attorney for the
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